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Abstract: The Blocking Lemma identies a particular blocking pair for each non-
stable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side
of the market to their optimal stable matching. Its interest lies in the fact that it has
been an instrumental result to prove key results on matching. For instance, the fact
that in the college admissions problem the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group
strategy-proof for the workers and the strong stability theorem in the marriage model
follow directly from the Blocking Lemma. However, it is known that the Blocking
Lemma and its consequences do not hold in the general many-to-one matching model
in which rms have substitutable preference relations. We show that the Blocking
Lemma holds for the many-to-one matching model in which rmspreference relations
are, in addition to substitutable, quota q separable. We also show that the Blocking
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Lemma holds on a subset of substitutable preference proles if and only if the workers-
optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on this subset of
proles.
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: C78, D71, D78.
Keywords: Matching, Stability, Blocking Lemma.
1 Introduction
Two-sided, many-to-one matching models study assignment problems where a nite set of
agents can be divided into two disjoint subsets: the set of institutions (called rms) and
the set of individuals (called workers). Each rm has a preference relation on all subsets
of workers and each worker has a preference relation on the set of rms plus the prospect
of remaining unmatched. A preference prole is a list of preference relations, one for each
agent. A matching assigns each rm with a subset of workers (possibly empty) in such a
way that each worker can work for at most one rm. Given a preference prole a matching
is called stable if all agents have acceptable partners (individual rationality) and there is
no unmatched worker-rm pair who both would prefer to be matched to each other rather
than staying with their current partners (pair-wise blocking).
The college admissions model with substitutable preferencesis the name given by Roth
and Sotomayor (1990) to the most general many-to-one model with ordinal preferences in
which stable matchings exist. Each rm is restricted to have a substitutable preference
relation on all subsets of workers; namely, each rm continues to want to employ a worker
even if other workers become unavailable (Kelso and Crawford (1982) were the rst to use
this property in a more general model with money). For each substitutable preference prole
the deferred-acceptance algorithms produce either the rms-optimal stable matching or the
workers-optimal stable matching, depending on whether the rms or the workers make the
o¤ers. The rms (workers)-optimal stable matching is unanimously considered by all rms
(respectively, workers) to be the best matching among all stable matchings.
A more specic many-to-one model, called the college admissions problemby Gale
and Shapley (1962), supposes that rms have a maximum number of positions to be lled
(their quota), and that each rm, given its ranking of individual workers, orders subsets
of workers in a responsive manner; namely, for any two subsets that di¤er in only one
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worker a rm prefers the subset containing the most-preferred worker.1 In this model the
Blocking Lemma says the following. Fix a responsive preference prole. Suppose that
the set of workers that strictly prefer an individually rational matching to the workers-
optimal stable matching is nonempty. Then, we can always nd a rm and a worker
with the following properties: (a) the rm and the worker block the individually rational
matching, (b) the rm was hiring another worker who strictly prefers the individually
rational matching to the workers-optimal stable matching, and (c) the worker (member of
the blocking pair) considers the workers-optimal stable matching to be at least as good
as the individually rational matching. The interest of the Blocking Lemma lies in the
fact that it is an instrumental result to prove key results on matching. For instance,
the fact that in the college admissions problem the workers-optimal stable mechanism is
group strategy-proof for the workers (Dubins and Freedman, 1981)2 and the strong stability
theorem in the marriage model (Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor, 1987) follow directly from
the Blocking Lemma. The rst result says that if in centralized markets (like entry-level
professional labor markets or the admission of students to colleges) a mechanism selects for
each preference prole its corresponding workers-optimal stable matching then, no group
of workers can never benet by reporting untruthfully their preference relations. This is
an important property and it becomes critical if the market has to be redesigned, in which
case the declared preference prole conveys very valuable information. The second result
says that every non-stable matching is either non-individually rational or we can identify a
blocking pair (a rm and a worker) and another stable matching such that both members
of the blocking pair weakly prefer to the original one.
It is known that the Blocking Lemma does not hold for the many-to-one matching model
with substitutable preference proles. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we
consider a weaker condition than responsiveness, called quota q separability, that together
with substitutability implies that the Blocking Lemma holds for all these preference proles
1Observe that the marriage model (i.e., the one-to-one matching model) is a particular instance of the
college admissions problemwhen all rms have quota one.
2To be precise, they show it for the marriage model, but their result can be extended to the college
admissions problem. Some results concerning stability in the college admissions problem are immediate
consequences of the fact that they hold for the marriage model. Each college is split into as many pieces as
positions it has, so transforming the original many-to-one model into a one-to-one model. Responsiveness
allows then the translation of stability from one model to another. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a
complete description of this procedure as well as for its applications. Observe that this reduction is possible
only if preferences are responsive.
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(Theorem 1).3 A rm is said to have a separable preference relation over all subsets of
workers if its partition between acceptable and unacceptable workers has the property that
only adding acceptable workers makes any given subset of workers a better one. However,
in many applications such as entry-level professional labor markets, separability alone does
not seem very reasonable because rms usually have fewer openings (their quota) than the
number of goodworkers looking for a job. In these cases it seems reasonable to restrict
the preference relations of rms in such a way that the separability condition operates only
up to their quota, considering unacceptable all subsets with higher cardinality. Moreover,
while responsiveness seems the relevant property for extending an ordered list of individual
students to a preference relation on all subsets of students, it is too restrictive, though,
to capture some degree of complementarity among workers, which can be very natural in
other settings. The quota q separability condition permits greater exibility in going from
orders on individuals to orders on subsets. For instance, candidates for a job can be grouped
together by areas of specialization. A rm with quota two may consider as the best subset
of workers not the set consisting of the rst two candidates on the individual ranking (which
may have both the same specialization) but rather the subset composed of the rst and
fourth candidates in the individual ranking (i.e., the rst in each area of specialization).
Second, we show (in Theorem 2) that the Blocking Lemma holds on a subset of substi-
tutable preference proles (not necessarily quota q separable) if and only if the workers-
optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on this subset of proles.
This means that, in contrast with what the literature has considered so far, the Block-
ing Lemma is more fundamental than just a key step to prove general results like group
strategy-proofness of the workers-optimal stable mechanism for the workers. Observe that
our former result (Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo, 2004) showing that the workers-
optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on the set of substitutable
and quota q separable preference proles was proved assuming that the Blocking Lemma
3We have already showed that if rms have substitutable and quota q separable preference proles
then, (a) the set of unmatched agents is the same in all stable matchings (Martínez, Massó, Neme, and
Oviedo, 2000), (b) the set of stable matchings has a lattice structure with two natural binary operations
(Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo, 2001), (c) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto
optimal for the workers, relative to the set of individually rational matchings (Martínez, Massó, Neme,
and Oviedo, 2004), and (d) the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers
(Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo, 2004). This last result is proven assuming that the Blocking Lemma
holds for all subsitutable and quota q separable preference proles; here, we are providing a proof that
this is indeed the case.
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was true on the set of all these proles. Hence, Theorem 2 and our former result does not
imply that the Blocking Lemma holds on the set of all substitutable and quota q separable
preference proles. Theorem 1 states that this is indeed the case.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, which closely follows Martinez, Massó,
Neme, and Oviedo (2004), we present the preliminary notation and denitions. In Sections
3 we present the Blocking Lemma and state, in Theorem 1, that it holds on the set of
all substitutable and q separable preference proles. In Section 4 we state and prove
the equivalence, on any subset of substitutable preference proles (not necessarily quota
q separable), between the Blocking Lemma and group strategy-proofness of the workers-
optimal stable mechanism for the workers. In Section 5 we conclude with an example of a
substitutable and quota q separable preference prole for which the symmetric Blocking
Lemma for the rms does not hold. We collect all proofs in two Appendices at the end of
the paper.
2 Preliminaries
There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of n rms F = ff1; :::; fng and the set of m
workers W = fw1; :::; wmg. Generic elements of both sets will be denoted, respectively, by
f , f , and ef , and by w, w, and ew. Each worker w 2 W has a strict, transitive, and complete
preference relation P (w) over F [ f;g, and each rm f 2 F has a strict, transitive, and
complete preference relation P (f) over 2W . Preference proles are (n+m)-tuples of pref-
erence relations and they are represented by P = (P (f1) ; :::; P (fn) ;P (w1) ; :::; P (wm)).
Given a preference relation of a rm P (f) the subsets of workers preferred to the empty set
by f are called acceptable. Similarly, given a preference relation of a worker P (w) the rms
preferred by w to the empty set are called acceptable. Therefore, we are allowing for the
possibility that rm f may prefer not to hire any worker rather than to hire unacceptable
subsets of workers and that worker w may prefer to remain unemployed rather than to
work for an unacceptable rm. To express preference relations in a concise manner, and
since only acceptable partners will matter, we write acceptable partners in the order of
decreasing preference. For instance,
P (fi) : w1w3; w2; w1; ;
P (wj) : f1; f3; ;
mean that fw1; w3gP (fi) fw2gP (fi) fw1gP (fi) ; and f1P (wj) f3P (wj) ;.
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A market is a triple (F;W; P ), where F is a set of rms, W is a set of workers, and P is
a preference prole. Given a market (F;W; P ) the assignment problem consists of matching
workers with rms, keeping the bilateral nature of their relationship and allowing for the
possibility that both, rms and workers, may remain unmatched. Formally,
Denition 1 A matching  is a mapping from the set F [W into the set of all subsets
of F [W such that for all w 2 W and f 2 F :
(a) Either j (w)j = 1 and  (w)  F or else  (w) = ;:
(b)  (f) 2 2W .
(c)  (w) = ffg if and only if w 2  (f) :
Condition (a) says that a worker can either be matched to at most one rm or remain
unmatched. Condition (b) says that a rm can either hire a subset of workers or be
unmatched. Finally, condition (c) states the bilateral nature of a matching in the sense
that rm f hires worker w if and only if worker w works for rm f . We say that w and f
are unmatched in a matching  if  (w) = ; and  (f) = ;. Otherwise, they are matched. A
matching  is said to be one-to-one if rms can hire at most one worker; namely, condition
(b) in Denition 1 is replaced by: Either j (f)j = 1 and  (f)  W or else  (f) = ;.
The model in which all matchings are one-to-one is also known in the literature as the
marriage model. The model in which all matchings are many-to-one (i.e., they satisfy
Denition 1) and rms have responsive preferences4 is also known in the literature as the
college admissions problem (Gale and Shapley, 1962). To represent matchings concisely
we will follow the widespread notation where, for instance, given F = ff1; f2; f3g and
W = fw1; w2; w3; w4g,
 =
 
f1 f2 f3 ;
w3w4 w1 ; w2
!
represents the matching where rm f1 is matched to workers w3 andw4, rm f2 is matched to
worker w1, and rm f3 and worker w2 are unmatched. Given a matching  and two subsets
F 0  F and W 0  W we denote by  (F 0) and  (W 0) the sets fw 2 W j  (w) 2 F 0g
and ff 2 F j 9w 2 W 0 such that w 2  (f)g, respectively; i.e., (F 0) = Sf2F 0 (f) and
(W 0) =
S
w2W 0 (w):
4Roughly, for any two subsets of workers that di¤er in only one worker a rm prefers the subset con-
taining the most-preferred worker. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a precise and formal denition of
responsive preferences as well as for a masterful and illuminating analysis of these models and an exhaustive
bibliography.
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Let P be a preference prole. Given a set of workers S  W , let Ch (S; P (f)) denote
rm fs most-preferred subset of S according to its preference relation P (f). Generically
we will refer to this set as the choice set.
A matching  is blocked by worker w if ;P (w) (w). A matching  is blocked by rm
f if  (f) 6= Ch ( (f) ; P (f)). We say that a matching is individually rational if it is
not blocked by any individual agent. We will denote by IR (P ) the set of individually
rational matchings. A matching  is blocked by a rm-worker pair (f; w) if w =2  (f),
w 2 Ch ( (f) [ fwg ; P (f)), and fP (w) (w).
Denition 2 A matching  is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent nor any
rm-worker pair.
Given a preference prole P , denote the set of stable matchings by S (P ). It is easy to
construct examples of preference proles with the property that the set of stable matchings
is empty. These examples share the feature that at least one rm regards a subset of workers
as being complements. This is the reason why the literature has focused on the restriction
where workers are regarded as substitutes (Kelso and Crawford (1982) were the rst to
introduce the notion of substitutable preferences).
Denition 3 A rm fs preference relation P (f) satises substitutability if for any set S
containing workers w and w0 (w 6= w0), if w 2 Ch (S; P (f)) then w 2 Ch (Sn fw0g ; P (f)).
A preference prole P is substitutable if for each rm f , the preference relation P (f)
satises substitutability.
Blair (1988) shows that the choice set of substitutable preference relations have the
following property.
Remark 1 Let P (f) be a substitutable preference relation and assume A and B are two
subsets of workers. Then, Ch (A [B;P (f)) = Ch (Ch (A;P (f)) [B;P (f)) :
Kelso and Crawford (1982) shows that (in a more general model with money) if all rms
have substitutable preference relations then: (1) the set of stable matchings is nonempty,
and (2) rms unanimously agree that a stable matching F is the best stable matching.
Roth (1984) extends these results and shows that if all rms have substitutable preference
relations then: (3) workers unanimously agree that a stable matching W is the best stable
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matching,5 and (4) the optimal stable matching for one side is the worst stable matching
for the other side. That is, S (P ) 6= ; and for all  2 S (P ) we have that FR (f)R (f)W
for all f 2 F and WR (w)R (w)F for all w 2 W .
The deferred-acceptance algorithm, originally dened by Gale and Shapley (1962) for
the marriage model, produces either F or W depending on who makes the o¤ers. At any
step k of the algorithm in which rms make o¤ers, a rm proposes itself to the choice set
of the set of workers that have not already rejected it during the previous steps, while a
worker accepts the o¤er of the best rm among the set of current o¤ers plus the one made
by the rm provisionally matched in the previous step (if any). The algorithm stops at step
K at which all o¤ers are accepted; the (provisional) matching then becomes denite and
it is the rms-optimal stable matching F . Symmetrically, at any step k of the algorithm
in which workers make o¤ers, a worker proposes himself to the best rm among the set of
rms that have not already rejected him during the previous steps, while a rm accepts the
choice set of the set of current o¤ers plus that of the workers provisionally matched in the
previous step (if any). The algorithm stops at step K at which all o¤ers are accepted; the
(provisional) matching then becomes denite and it is the workers-optimal stable matching
W .
Let P be a substitutable preference prole. In the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 we will
use properties of the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make o¤ers. For this
reason we present the following notation. For all f 2 F; the set
O(f) = fw 2 W j fR (w)W (w)g
is the set of workers that make an o¤er to f along the deferred-acceptance algorithm in
which workers make o¤ers and whose outcome is matching W : For any step 1  k < K, let
Ok (f) denote the set of workers that make an o¤er to f at k or at earlier steps. Obviously,
for all f 2 F ,
O1 (f)  :::  Ok (f)  :::  OK(f) = O (f) :
5The matchings F and W are called, respectively, the rms-optimal stable matching and the workers-
optimal stable matching. We are following the convention of extending preference relations from the original
sets (2W for the rms and F [ f;g for the workers) to the set of matchings. However, we now have to
consider weak orderings since the matchings  and 0 may associate to an agent the same partner. These
orderings will be denoted by R (f) and R (w). For instance, to say that all rms prefer F to any stable 
means that for every f 2 F we have that FR (f) for all stable  (that is, either F (f) =  (f) or else
F (f)P (f) (f)).
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Moreover, for all f 2 F;
W (f) = Ch (O(f); P (f)): (1)
Example 1 below (taken from Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2004)) illustrates
the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make o¤ers.
Example 1 Let F = ff1; f2; f3g andW = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the two sets of agents with
the substitutable preference prole P , where
P (f1) : w1w2; w2; w1; w4; ;,
P (f2) : w3; w2w4; w1w2; w4; w1; w2; ;,
P (f3) : w4; w1; w3; ;,
P (w1) : f2; f3; f1; ;,
P (w2) : f2; f1; ;,
P (w3) : f3; f2; ;,
P (w4) : f2; f1; f3; ;.
The following table summarizes the 6 steps of the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which
workers make o¤ers with the corresponding o¤er sets, choice sets, and rejected workers for
each of the three rms (we omit the brackets in the sets and write, for each fi, Oki and Ch
k
i
instead of Ok(fi) and Ch(Ok(fi); P (fi)), respectively).
f1 f2 f3
k Ok1 Ch
k
1 rejects O
k
2 Ch
k
2 rejects O
k
3 Ch
k
3 rejects
1 ; ;   w1; w2; w4 w2; w4 w1 w3 w3  
2 ; ;   w1; w2; w4 w2; w4   w1; w3 w1 w3
3 ; ;   w1; w2; w3; w4 w3 w2; w4 w1; w3 w1  
4 w2; w4 w2 w4 w1; w2; w3; w4 w3   w1; w3 w1  
5 w2; w4 w2   w1; w2; w3; w4 w3   w1; w3; w4 w4 w1
6 w1; w2; w4 w1; w2   w1; w2; w3; w4 w3   w1; w3; w4 w4  
Table 1
The algorithm terminates at step 6 (i.e., K = 6), when no worker is rejected, and
the provisional matching then becomes denite. For all f 2 F; O(f) = O6(f) and
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Ch(O(f); P (f)) = W (f); namely,
W =
 
f1 f2 f3
w1w2 w3 w4
!
is the workers-optimal stable matching. 
A rm f has a separable preference relation if the division between good workers
(fwgP (f) ;) and bad workers (;P (f) fwg) guides the ordering of subsets in the sense
that adding a good worker leads to a better set, while adding a bad worker leads to a worse
set.6 Formally,
Denition 4 A rm fs preference relation P (f) satises separability if for all S  W
and w =2 S we have that (S [ fwg)P (f)S if and only if fwgP (f);:
A preference prole P is separable if for each rm f , the preference relation P (f) satises
separability.
Remark 2 All separable preference relations are substitutable. To see this, just note that if
P (f) is separable then, for every S  W , Ch (S; P (f)) = fw 2 S j fwgP (f) ;g. Moreover,
the preference relation
P (f) : w1; w1w2; w2; ;
shows that not all substitutable preference relations are separable.
Sönmez (1996) shows that if rms have separable preference relations then there exists
a unique stable matching. A simple way to construct this unique stable matching  is as
follows: for each w 2 W , let  (w) be the maximal element, according to P (w), on the set
of rms for which w is an acceptable worker; i.e., ff 2 F j fwgP (f) ;g. The stability of 
follows directly from separability of rmspreferences.
Here, we will assume that each rm f has, in addition to a substitutable and separable
preference relation, a maximum number of positions to be lled: its quota qf . This limitation
may arise from, for example, technological, legal, or budgetary reasons. Since we are
interested in stable matchings we introduce this restriction by incorporating it into the
6This condition has been extensively used in social choice; see, for instance, Barberà, Sonnenschein,
and Zhou (1991). It has also been used in matching models; see, for instance, Alkan (2001), Dutta and
Massó (1997), Ehlers and Klaus (2003), Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2000, 2001, and 2004), Papai
(2000), and Sönmez (1996).
10
preference relation of the rm. The college admissions problem with responsive preference
proles (Gale and Shapley, 1962) incorporates the quota restriction of each rm by imposing
a limit on the number of workers that a rm may admit. However, from the point of view of
stability, this is equivalent to supposing that all sets of workers with cardinality larger than
the quota are unacceptable for the rm. Therefore, even if the number of good workers for
rm f is larger than its quota qf , all sets of workers with cardinality strictly larger than qf
will be unacceptable. Formally,
Denition 5 A rm fs preference relation P (f) over sets of workers is qf separable if:
(a) For all S ( W such that jSj < qf and w =2 S we have that (S [ fwg)P (f)S if and only
if fwgP (f);.
(b) ;P (f)S for all S such that jSj > qf .7
We will denote by q = (qf )f2F the list of quotas and we will say that a preference prole
P is quota q separable if each P (f) is quota qf separable. In principle we may have
rms with di¤erent quotas. The case where all rms have quota 1 separable preference
relations is equivalent, from the point of view of the set of stable matchings, to the marriage
model. Hence, our set-up includes the marriage model as a particular case. In general, and
given a list of quotas q, the sets of separable and quota q separable preference relations
are unrelated. Moreover, quota q separability does not imply substitutability and the
set of responsive preference relations is a strict subset of the set of quota qf separable
and substitutable preference relations. There are quota q separable preference proles for
which the set of stable matchings is empty (see Example 1 in Martínez, Massó, Neme, and
Oviedo (2004)).
3 The Blocking Lemma
The Blocking Lemma is a statement relative to a substitutable preference prole. Given
a substitutable preference prole P , the Blocking Lemma states that if the set of workers
that strictly prefer an individually rational matching  to W is nonempty then, we can
7For the purpose of studying the set of stable matchings, condition (b) in this denition could be replaced
by the following condition: jCh (S; P (f))j  qf for all S such that jSj > qf . We choose condition (b) since
it is simpler. Sönmez (1996) uses an alternative approach which consists of deleting condition (b) in the
denition but then requiring in the denition of a matching that j (f)j  qf for all f 2 F . Notice that in
his approach the set of separable preference relations of rm f is quota qf separable for all qf .
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always nd a blocking pair (f; w) of  with the property that f was hiring at  a worker
strictly preferring  to W and w considers W being at least as good as . Formally,
Denition 6 (The Blocking Lemma) Let P be a substitutable preference prole and
let  2 IR (P ). Denote by W 0 = fw 2 W j  (w)P (w)W (w)g the set of workers who
strictly prefer  to W : Assume W
0 is nonempty. We say that the Blocking Lemma holds
at P if there exist f 2 (W 0) and w 2 WnW 0 such that the pair (f; w) blocks :
Let eP be a subset of substitutable preference proles. We say that the Blocking Lemma
holds on eP if it holds at all P 2 eP.
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) proved the Blocking Lemma for the marriage model (i.e.,
the Blocking Lemma holds on the set of all proles of preference relations in which each
agent only orders the set of individual agents of the other side of the market plus the
prospect of remaining unmatched). Using the decomposition described in Footnote 2, it
is easy to see that the Blocking Lemma also holds for the college admission problem (i.e.,
on the set of all responsive preference proles). In Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo
(2004) we exhibit an example (Example 1 above used to illustrate the deferred-acceptance
algorithm in which workers make o¤ers) of a substitutable preference prole P for which
the Blocking Lemma does not hold at P . For completeness, we reproduce below why the
Blocking Lemma does not hold at P .
Example 1 (Continued) Consider F , W; and the substitutable preference prole P of
Example 1. As we have already found, the workers-optimal stable matching is
W =
 
f1 f2 f3
w1w2 w3 w4
!
:
The individually rational matching
 =
 
f1 f2 f3
w4 w1w2 w3
!
has the property that for all w 2 W , (w)P (w)W (w). Hence, WnW 0 = ; since W 0 =
fw 2 W j (w)P (w)W (w)g = W: Therefore, we can not nd w 2 WnW 0 and f 2 (W 0)
such that (f; w) blocks : Thus, the conclusion of the Blocking Lemma does not hold at P .
Theorem 1 The Blocking Lemma holds on the set of all substitutable and quota q separable
preference proles.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix 1.
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4 Blocking Lemma and Group Strategy-proofness
Many real matching markets are centralized. A centralized matching market consists of
a clearinghouse that, after asking each agent to report a preference relation, proposes a
matching. This denes a mechanism. A mechanism is stable if it proposes, for each reported
preference prole, a stable matching.8 Formally, let P be a domain of preference proles and
letM be the set of all matchings. A mechanism h : P !M maps each preference prole
P 2 P to a matching h (P ) 2 M. Therefore, h (P ) (f) is the set of workers assigned to f
and h (P ) (w) is the rm assigned to w (if any) at preference prole P 2 P by mechanism
h. A mechanism h : P !M is stable if for all P 2 P, h(P ) 2 S(P ).
Let S be the set of substitutable preference relations of any rm on 2W and let T be
the set of all preference relations of any worker on F [ f;g. The set of all substitutable
preference proles can be written as the set P = SFT W . Let eS be a subset of substitutable
preference relations for any rm and let eP = eSF T W .9 To emphasize the role of a subset
of workers cW we will write the preference prole P 2 eP as (PcW ; P cW ). Therefore, given
P 2 eP ; cW  W , and P 0cW 2 T cW ; we write (P 0cW ; P cW ) to denote the preference prole P 0
obtained from P after replacing PcW 2 T cW by P 0cW 2 T cW . Mechanisms require each agent
to report some preference relation. A mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers if
for all subsets of workers they can never obtain better partners by revealing their preference
relations untruthfully. Formally,
Denition 7 A mechanism h : eP ! M is group strategy-proof for the workers if for all
preference proles P 2 eP, all subsets of workers cW  W; and all reports P 0cW 2 T cW ,
h (P ) (w)R (w)h(P 0cW ; P cW ) (w)
for some w 2 cW .
We say that hW : eP !M is the workers-optimal stable mechanism if it always selects
the workers-optimal stable matching; that is, for all P 2 eP, hW (P ) is the workers-optimal
8The National Resident Matching Program is a very well-know example of a centralized entry-level
professional labor market in the U.S.A. that uses a stable mechanism to match yearly around 20,000
medical students to hospital programs to undertake their medical internship (see Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) for a description an analysis of this market). See Roth and Xing (1994) for a discussion of many
centralized matching markets.
9Observe that the domain of preference relations of the workers is unrestricted while the domain of
preference relations of the rms may be any subset of substitutable preference relations.
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stable matching relative to P . Theorem 2 below states that the Blocking Lemma and group
strategy-proofness of the workers-optimal stable mechanism for the workers are equivalent
on any subset of substitutable preference proles eP = eSF  T W .
Theorem 2 The Blocking Lemma holds on eP if and only if the workers-optimal stable
mechanism hW : eP !M is group strategy-proof for the workers.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix 2 at the end of the paper.
5 Concluding Remark
One may ask whether or not the symmetric Blocking Lemma for the rms also holds on
the same set of preference proles for which the Blocking Lemma holds for the workers.
The answer is negative because it does not even hold on the smaller subset of responsive
preference proles. Example 2 (taken from Roth (1984a)) contains a substitutable and
quota q separable preference prole P for which the Blocking Lemma for the rms does
not hold at P .
Example 2 Let F = ff1; f2; f3g andW = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the two sets of agents with
the (2; 1; 1) separable and substitutable preference prole P ,10 where
P (f1) : w1w2; w1w3; w2w3; w1w4; w2w4; w3w4; w1; w2; w3; w4; ;,
P (f2) : w1; w2; w3; w4; ;,
P (f3) : w3; w1; w2; w4; ;,
P (w1) : f3; f1; f2; ;,
P (w2) : f2; f1; f3; ;,
P (w3) : f1; f3; f2; ;,
P (w4) : f1; f2; f3; ;.
The rms-optimal stable matching is
F =
 
f1 f2 f3
w1w4 w2 w3
!
:
10Observe that P is indeed a responsive preference prole.
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Consider the individually rational matching
 =
 
f1 f2 f3
w1w4 w2 w3
!
:
The set of rms that prefer  to F is F
0  ff 2 F j (f)P (f)F (f)g = ff1; f3g. Thus,
FnF 0 = ff2g: However, f2 can only block  together with w1; but (w1) = f1P (w1)f2:
Hence, the Blocking Lemma for the rms does not hold at P: Note that this prole is used
in Roth (1984a) to show that, in the college admissions problem, the deferred-acceptance
algorithm in which rms make o¤ers is not strategy-proof for the rms. 
6 Appendix 1: Proof of Theorem 1
Through out all this appendix we will assume that P is a substitutable and quota q separable
preference prole and that  2 IR (P ). The set of workers who strictly prefer  to W
will be denoted by W 0 = fw 2 W j  (w)P (w)W (w)g and we will assume that W 0 is
nonempty.
In the proof of the Blocking Lemma for the marriage model (i.e., qf = 1 for all f 2 F ),
the rm f that, together with a worker w, blocks  is matched at  because f 2  (W 0);
that is, f lls its quota at  (i.e., j (f)j = qf = 1). In the proof of the Blocking Lemma for
the many-to-one model, the rm f that, together with a worker w, blocks  is also matched
at  because f 2  (W 0), but now it will be necessary to consider separately the case in
which f does not ll its quota at  (i.e., j (f)j < qf) from the case in which f lls its
quota at  (i.e., j (f)j = qf). Proposition 1 considers the case where j (f)j < qf : For the
case where j (f)j = qf the proof of the Blocking Lemma will also be decomposed, as in the
marriage model, into two propositions depending on whether or not (W 0) = W (W
0) holds
(Proposition 2 for the simple case where they are di¤erent and Proposition 3 for the more
involved case where they are equal). However, before proving these three propositions, we
prove a series of three lemmata that will be used in the proof of all three propositions since
they hold regardless of whether or not (W 0) = W (W
0) and whether or not all rms in
 (W 0) ll their quota at .
Lemma 1 For each f 2 (W 0); jW (f)j = qf .
Proof. Assume otherwise and let f 0 2 (W 0) be such that jW (f 0)j < qf 0 : Since W 0 is
nonempty and f 0 2  (W 0) there exists w0 2 W 0 such that f 0 =  (w0)P (w0)W (w0), which
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implies that w0 =2 W (f 0). Moreover,  2 IR (P ), quota qf 0 separability of P (f 0), and
jW (f 0)j < qf 0 imply w0 2 Ch (W (f 0) [ fw0g ; P (f 0)). Thus, (f 0; w0) blocks W ; which is a
contradiction.
Lemma 2 Assume there exist f 2 (W 0) and w 2 Ch((f) [ W (f); P (f))nf[W (f) \
W 0] [ [(f) \ (WnW 0)]g. Then w 2 WnW 0, and (f; w) blocks :
Proof. Since w 2 Ch((f) [ W (f); P (f)) and w =2 [W (f) \ W 0] [ [(f) \ (WnW 0)];
we have that either w 2 W 0 and w 2 (f)nW (f) or w 2 WnW 0 and w 2 W (f)n(f).
Assume w 2 W 0 and w 2 (f)nW (f). Then,
f = (w)P (w)W (f): (2)
Moreover, w 2 Ch((f) [ W (f); P (f)) implies, by substitutability of P (f), that w 2
Ch(W (f) [ fwg; P (f)); which together with (2) imply that (f; w) blocks W . Therefore,
we can assume that w 2 WnW 0 and w 2 W (f)n(f). Then,
f = W (w)P (w)(w): (3)
Moreover, w 2 Ch((f) [ W (f); P (f)) implies, by substitutability of P (f), that w 2
Ch((f) [ fwg; P (f)); which together with (3) imply that (f; w) blocks :
By Remark 1 and condition (1), Lemma 2 can also be stated as follows.
Remark 3 Assume there exist f 2 (W 0) and w 2 Ch((f) [ O(f); P (f))nf[W (f) \
W 0] [ [(f) \ (WnW 0)]g. Then w 2 WnW 0, and (f; w) blocks :
Lemma 3 Assume there exists f 2 (W 0) such that j(f) \W 0j 6= jW (f) \W 0j. Then,
there exist ef 2 (W 0) and w 2 WnW 0 such that ( ef; w) blocks :
Proof. It follows from Claims 1 and 2 below.
Claim 1 Assume there exists f 2 (W 0) such that j(f) \W 0j > jW (f) \W 0j. Then,
there exists w 2 WnW 0 such that (f; w) blocks :
Proof of Claim 1. Assume f 2  (W 0). We will rst show that j(f) \W 0j >
jW (f) \W 0j implies that there exists w 2 Ch((f)[W (f); P (f))nf[W (f)\W 0][[(f)\
(WnW 0)]g. To see this, rst observe that, by Lemma 1, jW (f)j = qf . Moreover,
jW (f)j = jW (f) \W 0j+ jW (f) \ (WnW 0)j = qf
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and
j(f)j = j(f) \W 0j+ j(f) \ (WnW 0)j  qf : (4)
By hypothesis and (4), jW (f) \W 0j+ j(f) \ (WnW 0)j < qf : By jW (f)j = qf , W (f) 
(f) [ W (f), and qf separability of P (f), jCh((f) [ W (f); P (f))j = qf . Hence, there
exists
w 2 Ch((f) [ W (f); P (f))nf[W (f) \W 0] [ [(f) \ (WnW 0)]g:
By Lemma 2, (f; w) blocks :
Claim 2 Assume there exists f 2 (W 0) such that j(f) \W 0j < jW (f) \W 0j : Then,
there exist ef 2 (W 0) and w 2 WnW 0 such that ( ef; w) blocks :
Proof of Claim 2. By denition, W 0 = [f2(W 0)((f) \W 0). Thus, [f2(W 0)((f) \
W 0)  W 0: Therefore,
jW 0j =
X
f2(W 0)
(f) \W 0  X
f2(W 0)
W (f) \W 0 :
Hence, by the hypothesis that there exists f 2 (W 0) such that j(f) \W 0j < jW (f) \W 0j ;
there exists ef 2 (W 0) with the property that ( ef) \W 0 > W ( ef) \W 0 : This ef satises
the hypothesis of Claim 1, and hence, there exists w 2 WnW 0 such that ( ef; w) blocks .
Proposition 1 Assume f 2 (W 0) is such that j(f)j < qf .11 Then, there exist ef 2  (W 0)
and w 2 WnW 0 such that ( ef; w) blocks :
Proof. Let f 2 (W 0) be such that j(f)j < qf : By Lemma 1, jW (f)j = qf : We consider
two cases:
Case 1. j(f) \W 0j 6= jW (f) \W 0j : By Lemma 3, there exist ef 2  (W 0) and w 2 WnW 0
such that ( ef; w) blocks :
Case 2. j(f) \W 0j = jW (f) \W 0j : Then, j(f) \ (WnW 0)j < jW (f) \ (WnW 0)j since
j(f)j < qf = jW (f)j : Hence, there exists w 2 (W (f) \ (WnW 0)) n ((f) \ (WnW 0)) :
In particular, w 2 (W (f) \ (WnW 0)) n(f). Therefore, since w =2 W 0, w =2 (f), and
w = W (f) we have that
fP (w)(w): (5)
11Note that f 2 (W 0) and j(f)j < 1 are incompatible in the marriage model.
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Moreover, by quota qf -separability of P (f) and the individual rationality of W , w is a
good worker for f . Hence, j(f)j < qf implies
w 2 Ch((f) [ fwg; P (f)): (6)
Conditions (5) and (6) say that f 2 (W 0) and w 2 WnW 0 are such that (f; w) blocks .
Proposition 2 Assume (W 0) 6= W (W 0) and, for all f 2 (W 0), j(f)j = qf . Then,
there exist f 2 (W 0) and w 2 WnW 0 such that (f; w) blocks .
Proof. Consider the following two cases:
Case 1. There exists f 2 (W 0)nW (W 0). Thus, there is w0 2 W 0 such that w0 2
(f); implying j (f) \W 0j  1. Moreover, f =2 W (W 0) implies that jW (f) \W 0j = 0.
Therefore, j(f) \W 0j 6= jW (f) \W 0j. Hence, by Lemma 3, the conclusion of Proposition
2 holds.
Case 2. There exists f 2 W (W 0)n(W 0): Thus, there is w0 2 W 0 such that w0 2 W (f);
implying jW (f) \W 0j  1. Moreover, f =2  (W 0) implies j (f) \W 0j = 0. Therefore,
j(f) \W 0j 6= jW (f) \W 0j. Hence, by Lemma 3, the conclusion of Proposition 2 holds.
Finally, Proposition 3 below states that the conclusion of the Blocking Lemma holds for
all remaining cases where (W 0) = W (W
0).
Proposition 3 Assume (W 0) = W (W 0) and, for all f 2 (W 0), the following three
properties hold:
(a) j (f)j = qf :
(b) j(f) \W 0j = jW (f) \W 0j.
(c) Ch((f) [O(f); P (f))nf[W (f) \W 0] [ [(f) \ (WnW 0)]g = ;:
Then, there exist f 2 (W 0) and w 2 WnW 0 such that (f; w) blocks .
Proof. By (c), for all f 2 (W 0); Ch((f) [ O(f); P (f))  f[W (f) \ W 0] [ [(f) \
(WnW 0)]g: We want to show that this inclusion holds with equality. We will do it by
showing that the two sets have the same cardinality.
By (a), quota q separability of P (f), and  (f)   (f)[O (f) ; jCh((f) [O(f); P (f))j =
qf . Thus,
j(W (f) \W 0) [ ((f) \ (WnW 0))j  jW (f) \W 0j+ j(f) \ (WnW 0)j
= j(f) \W 0j+ j(f) \ (WnW 0)j by (b)
= j(f)j
= qf by (a).
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Hence,
Ch((f) [O(f); P (f)) = f[W (f) \W 0] [ [(f) \ (WnW 0)]g: (7)
Claim 3 For all w 2 W 0; W (w) 6= ;:
Proof of Claim 3 By denition,W 0 = [f2(W 0)(f). Hence,W 0 = ([f2(W 0)(f))\W 0:
Because all workers can work at most for one rm and since (b) holds,
jW 0j =Pf2(W 0) j(f) \W 0j =Pf2(W 0) jW (f) \W 0j : (8)
If there would exist w 2 W 0 such that W (w) = ; then, jW 0j >
P
f2(W 0) jW (f) \W 0j ;
which would contradict (8). 
For each step 1  k  K of the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make
o¤ers, dene the set Tk as the set of pairs of rms and workers in (W 0) andW 0, respectively,
with the property that w is acceptable for f; w makes an o¤er to f at k or at earlier steps,
and f rejects w at step k: Namely,
Tk =

(f; w) 2  (W 0)W 0 j w 2 Ch (fwg ; P (f)) \Ok(f) and w =2 Ch  Ok (f) ; P (f)	 :
(9)
Set T0 = ;: Since for all 1 < k  K and all f 2 F; Ok 1(f)  Ok(f) holds, substitutability
of P (f) implies that, for all 1  k  K, Tk 1  Tk. Furthermore, there exists 1  k  K
such that Tk 6= ;: To see that, note that: (i) each w 2 W 0 makes an o¤er to f = (w) at
(some) step k of the algorithm (w 2 Ok(f)), (ii) w is acceptable for f (w 2 Ch(fwg; P (f)),
and (iii) since w =2 W (f); f rejects w at (some) step k  k (w =2 Ch(Ok(f); P (f)).
Therefore, step kM where
kM = maxf1  k  K j TknTk 1 6= ;g
is well-dened. By Claim 3, TKnTK 1 = ;: Hence, and since T0 = ;; 1  kM < K:
Claim 4 For all f 2 (W 0) and all k  kM ;
Ok (f) > qf :
Proof of Claim 4 By denition of TkM ; for all f 2  (W 0) and all w 2  (f) \ W 0;
(f; w) 2 TkM : Since  2 IR (P ), w is acceptable for f: Hence, by quota qf separability
of P (f), w =2 Ch  OkM (f) ; P (f) implies Ok (f) > qf for all k  kM because Ok (f) 
OkM (f) for all k  kM . 
By denition of kM and (1), for all f 2  (W 0) and all k  kM ;
Ch
 
Ok (f) ; P (f)
 \W 0  W (f) \W 0 = Ch (O (f) ; P (f)) \W 0: (10)
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Let (f1; w1) 2  (W 0)  W 0 be a pair such that (f1; w1) 2 TkMnTkM 1. By Claim 3,
W (w1) 6= ;: Hence, there exists f2 2  (W 0) such that
w1 2 W (f2) : (11)
Claim 5 There exists k > kM such thatw1 2 Ok(f2)nOk 1(f2) andw1 2 Ch
 
Ok

(f2) ; P (f2)

:
Proof of Claim 5. By (11) and the fact that w1 2 W 0; w1 2 W (f2)\W 0: Hence, there
exists k such that w1 2 Ch
 
Ok

(f2) ; P (f2)

: Note that k > kM because at step kM ; w1
was rejected by rm f1: 
Claim 6 Ch
 
OkM (f2) [  (f2) ; P (f2)
 nW (f2) \W 0 \OkM (f2) [ [ (f2) \WnW 0]	 6=
;:
Proof of Claim 6. By (7) and f2 2  (W 0) ;
Ch((f2) [O(f2); P (f2)) = f[W (f2) \W 0] [ [(f2) \ (WnW 0)]g: (12)
Let w 2 (f2) \ (WnW 0): By (12), w 2 Ch((f2) [ O(f2); P (f2)): By substitutability of
P (f2), OkM (f2)  O (f2) ; and the fact that (f2) \ (WnW 0)  (f2); w 2 Ch((f2) [
OkM (f2); P (f2)): Hence,
[(f2) \ (WnW 0)]  Ch
 
OkM (f2) [  (f2) ; P (f2)

:
Moreover, [W (f2) \W 0 \ OkM (f2)]  W (f2) \W 0. Let w 2 [W (f2) \W 0 \ OkM (f2)]:
Then, w 2 W (f2) \W 0. By (12), w 2 Ch((f2) [ O(f2); P (f2)): By substitutability of
P (f2); w 2 Ch
 
OkM (f2) [  (f2) ; P (f2)

: Hence,
[W (f2) \W 0 \OkM (f2)]  Ch
 
OkM (f2) [  (f2) ; P (f2)

:
By (a), j (f2)j = qf2 : Moreover,  (f2)  OkM (f2) [  (f2) holds trivially: By individual
rationality of  and quota qf2 separability of P (f2),Ch  OkM (f2) [  (f2) ; P (f2) = qf2 : (13)
By Claim 5, w1 =2 OkM (f2) : Hence, w1 2 W (f2) \W 0 implies
j[(f2) \ (WnW 0)]j+
[W (f2) \W 0 \OkM (f2)] < qf2 : (14)
To see that (14) holds, observe that, by (a), j[(f2) \ (WnW 0)]j+ j[(f2) \W 0]j = j (f2)j =
qf2 : By (b), j(f2) \ (WnW 0)j + jW (f2) \W 0j = qf2 : Since w1 2 W (f2) \W 0 and w1 =2
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OkM (f2) we have that
W (f2) \W 0 \OkM (f2) < jW (f2) \W 0j :Hence, (14) holds. Thus,
by (13), the statement of Claim 6 holds. 
Let
ew 2 Ch  OkM (f2) [  (f2) ; P (f2) nW (f2) \W 0 \OkM (f2) [ [((f2) \WnW 0]	 6= ;:
(15)
By Claim 6, such ew exists. We will show that ew =2 W 0: Assume otherwise; i.e., ew 2 W 0:
If ew 2 (f2) then ew 2 OkM (f2). Hence, ew 2 W (f2): Thus, ( ew) = f2 = W ( ew) ; which
contradicts that ew 2 W 0: If ew 2 OkM (f2) then ew 2 W (f2). Thus, ew 2 W (f2) \W 0 \
OkM (f2) : But (15) says that ew =2 (f2) \W 0 \OkM (f2), a contradiction. Hence, ew 2 W 0:
By (15), ew =2 (f2) \ (WnW 0). Since ew =2 W 0;
ew =2 (f2): (16)
By (15) again, ew 2 Ch(OkM (f2) [ (f2); P (f2)): Hence, by substitutability of P (f2);
ew 2 Ch((f2) [ f ewg; P (f2)): (17)
By ew 2 Ch(OkM (f2) [ (f2); P (f2)) and (16), ew 2 OkM (f2) : Hence,
f2R( ew)W ( ew): (18)
Moreover, by ew =2 W 0,
W ( ew)R( ew)( ew); (19)
and by (16), ( ew) 6= f2. Hence, by (18) and (19),
f2P ( ew)( ew): (20)
Thus, since f2 2 (W 0) and ew =2 W 0, (16), (17) and (20) say that the conclusion of the
Blocking Lemma holds. 
7 Appendix 2: Proof of Theorem 2
=)) Assume that the Blocking Lemma holds on eP = eSF  T W and suppose, to get a
contradiction, that hW : eP !M is not strategy-proof for the workers; namely, there exist
P 2 eP ; a nonempty subset of workers cW; and P 0cW 2 T cW such that for all w 2 cW ,
0W (w) = hW (P
0cW ; P cW ) (w)P (w)hW (P ) (w) = W (w) :
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We rst show that 0W 2 IR (P ). Since 0W 2 S(P 0cW ; P cW ) and P 0(i) = P (i) for
all i 2 (F [W ) ncW , 0W (i)R0(i); if i 2 WnW 0 and 0W (i) = Ch(0W (i); P 0(i)) if i 2 F:
Moreover, for all w 2 cW , 0W (w)P (w)W (w)R(w);. Hence, 0W 2 IR (P ). Since all
matchings  2 S (P ) have the property that WR (w) for all w 2 W and there exists at
least one w 2 cW with 0W (w)P (w)W (w), we conclude that 0W =2 S (P ) : Since ; 6= cW 
W 0 = fw 2 W j 0W (w)P (w)W (w)g and the Blocking Lemma holds at P 2 eP, there exists
a pair (f; w), where f 2 (W 0) and w 2 WnW 0 such that (f; w) blocks 0W at P . But
w 2 WnW 0 implies P 0(w) = P (w). Thus, (f; w) blocks  at (P 0cW ; P cW ), contradicting that
0W 2 S(P 0cW ; P cW ).
(=) Assume that hW : eP !M is group strategy-proof for the workers and suppose, to get
a contradiction, that the Blocking Lemma does not hold on eP ; namely, there exist P 2 eP
and an individually rational matching  such that
W 0 = fw 2 W j  (w)P (w)W (w) = hW (P )g 6= ;:
For all w0 2 W 0, consider the preference relation P 0(w) 2 T , where
P 0(w) :  (w) ; ;:
Since hW is group strategy-proof for the workers, there exists w0 2 W 0 such that
hW (P
0
W 0 ; P W 0) (w
0) = ;;
otherwise, if for all w 2 W 0; hW (P 0W 0 ; P W 0) (w) =  (w), W 0 would manipulate hW at P .
Let f 0 =  (w0). Then, f 0 2  (W 0) :
Let 0W = hW (P
0
W 0 ; P W 0) and W = hW (P ) be the corresponding workers-optimal
stable matchings in S (P 0W 0 ; P W 0) and S (P ), respectively. Let P
0 = (P 0W 0 ; P W 0) : For all
f 2 F; we denote by
OP (f) = fw 2 W j fR (w)W (w)g
and
OP 0(f) = fw 2 W j fR0 (w)0W (w)g
the set of worker that make an o¤er to f along the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which
workers make o¤ers applied to P and P 0, respectively. Let OkP (f) denote the set of all
workers that make an o¤er to f along the deferred acceptance algorithm applied to P at k
or at earlier steps. Then,
O1P (f)  :::  OkP (f)  :::  OKP (f) = OP (f) :
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Similarly,
O1P 0 (f)  :::  OkP 0 (f)  :::  OK
0
P 0 (f) = OP 0 (f) :
Then, for all f 2 F , W (f) = Ch (OP (f) ; P (f)) and 0W (f) = Ch (OP 0 (f) ; P (f)) :
Claim 7 For all w =2 W 0; 0W (w)R (w)W (w) :
Proof of Claim 7. Assume otherwise; i.e., there existsw =2 W 0 such that W (w)P (w)0W (w) :
Let km  K 0 be the rst step in the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make
o¤ers applied to P 0 in which there exist a rm and a worker w 2 W (f) such that w is
rejected by f . Namely,
km = min

k  K 0 j 9(f; w) s. t. w 2 OkP 0 (f) ; w 2 W (f) ; and w =2 Ch
 
OkP 0 (f) ; P (f)
	
:
(21)
Note that P (w) = P 0(w). The assumption that W (w)P (w)
0
W (w) implies that there
exists 1  k < K 0 such that w is rejected by f = W (w) along the deferred-acceptance
algorithm in which workers make o¤ers applied to P 0; i.e., f = W (w) ; w 2 OkP 0
 
f

and
w =2 Ch  OkP 0  f ; P  f : Let f 1 and w be the pair satisfying (21) at step km: Assume
OkmP 0 (f 1)  OP (f 1): Then,
w 2 W (f 1) = Ch(OP (f 1); P (f 1))
and
w =2 Ch(OkmP 0 (f 1); P 0(f 1));
which contradicts substitutability of P (f 1) since P (f 1) = P
0(f 1): Hence, O
km
P 0 (f 1) "
OP (f 1): Let w1 be such that
w1 2 OkmP 0 (f 1) (22)
and
w1 =2 OP (f 1): (23)
By the denition of OP (f 1); (23) implies that
W (w1)P (w1)f 1: (24)
By (22),
f 1R
0(w1)0W (w1): (25)
If w1 2 W 0 then, by denition of P 0(w1); f 1 = (w1): Hence, f 1 = (w1)P (w1)W (w1);
contradicting (24). Then, w1 =2 W 0: Hence, P 0(w1) = P (w1): Thus, (25) can be written as
f 1R(w1)
0
W (w1): (26)
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Thus, (24) and (26) imply
W (w1)P (w1)f 1R(w1)
0
W (w1)R(w1);:
Hence, there exists f2 such that f2 = W (w1): Therefore, there exists bk  km such that
w1 2 ObkP 0(f2); w1 2 W (f2) and w1 =2 Ch(ObkP 0(f2); P (f2)): Since f2P (w1)f 1 and w1 2
O
bk
P 0(f2); w1 makes an o¤er to f2 along the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers
make o¤ers applied to P 0; and w1 is rejected. But later, w1 makes an o¤er to f 1. Hence,bk < km: A contradiction. Thus, for all w =2 W 0; 0W (w)R(w)W (w): 
Claim 8 Let w0 2 W 0 be such that hW (P 0W 0 ; P W 0) (w0) = ; and (w0) = f 0: Then,
Ch ( (f 0) [OP 0 (f 0) ; P (f 0)) *  (f 0) :
Proof of Claim 8. Assume Ch ( (f 0) [OP 0 (f 0) ; P (f 0))   (f 0) : Since  2 IR (P ) ;
Ch ( (f 0) [OP 0 (f 0) ; P (f 0)) =  (f 0) : Hence, by assumption,
w0 2  (f 0) = Ch ( (f 0) [OP 0 (f 0) ; P (f 0)) ;
and, by substitutability of P (f 0),
w0 2 Ch (OP 0 (f 0) [ fw0g; P (f 0)) :
By denition of P 0(w0); w0 2 OP 0 (f 0) : Hence, w0 2 0W (f 0) ; which contradicts that
0W (w
0) = ;: Thus, Ch ( (f 0) [OP 0 (f 0) ; P (f 0)) *  (f 0) : 
Let w1 2 Ch ( (f 0) [OP 0 (f 0) ; P (f 0)) n (f 0). Assume w1 2 W 0. Since w1 =2 (f 0);
w1 2 OP 0(f 0): Therefore, w1 2 OP 0(f 0) \W 0: But w1 2 W 0 means that P 0(w1) : (w1); ;:
Hence, w1 makes an o¤er to f 0 along the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers
make o¤ers applied to P 0 (i.e., w1 2 OP 0(f 0)). Hence, by denition of P 0(w1), w1 2 (f 0);
a contradiction. Thus, w1 =2 W 0. By substitutability of P (f 0),
w1 2 Ch ( (f 0) [ fw1g; P (f 0)) (27)
and
w1 2 0W (f 0) = Ch (OP 0 (f 0) ; P (f 0)) : (28)
Since w1 =2 W 0; W (w1)R(w1)(w1): By (28),
f 0 = 0W (w1)R (w1)W (w1)R (w1) (w1) : (29)
By assumption, (w1) 6= f 0. Thus, (29) implies
f 0P (w1)(w1): (30)
Conditions (27) and (30) imply that (f 0; w1) blocks ; and f 0 =  (W 0) and w1 =2 W 0.
Hence, the Blocking Lemma holds at P . 
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